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Abstract
Economic Growth Cycles in the Centrally Planned Economies,
A Hypothesis of the "Long Cycle"
The analysis of the long-term growth trend in the centrally planned
economies allows us to ascertain the regular character of periodic
changes in the rate of economic growth. The detailed examination of
this phenomenon leads to the conclusion that the sociopolitical and
economic mechanism of this process is of an endogenous character, i.e.,
the reproduction process under socialism is of a cyclical character.
The "long cycle" hypothesis has been put forward to define several
recent years, particularly distinct in the Polish economy. It is
modified as compared with earlier "traditional" cycles.
The cyclical nature of economic growth in socialism is very closely
connected with its influence on the state's abilities to satisfy the
needs of society. This influence has been estimated as negative on the
basis of losses and profits balance. Hence some proposals have been
put forward as to selection of means that could reduce the causes of
the cyclical growth.

Economic Growth Cycles in the Centrally Planned Economies.
A Hypothesis of the "Long Cycle"
1 . Regularity in Economic Growth Fluctuations
When studying the formation of economic dynamics in Poland, we notice
the fact that it is by no means of a uniform character. This is quite
understandable when keeping in view the complex mechanism of economic
growth and the way in which its factors are correlated. More detailed
study of this phenomenon allows us to put forward a thesis that changes
in economic dynamics are of a regular nature which leads to several
years' periods of economic growth at either accelerating or decelerating
rate alternating over time. It should be noted, however, that except
for the specific case of Poland during the late seventies and eighties,
those changes refer to relative oscillations and not to periodic abso-
lute decrease in basic macroeconomic quantities, although it happened
in some other countries as well.
Attempting to determine definite periods of economic growth in the
centrally planned economies in terms of growth rate changes we can dis-
2tinguish several time intervals featured by different economic dynamics
(see Table 1 and Figure 1).
The phenomenon of economic dynamics oscillation as it was recognized
in particular countries has made some. authors put forward a thesis that
changes take place within quite similar limits of time (Bauer 1978,
Goldman 1965, and Kyn and Schrett 1979). However, this opinion is—or
should we say was—right in part only.
Such a course of reproduction processes as it is in the European
3CMEA countries results from different economic positions they occupied
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at the starting point to so-called socialist industrialization. The
transformation into an industrialized country was necessary to develop
fixed assets for production and, what is more important, to remove war
devastations, these also varying enormously in particular countries.
The conditions differed from one country to another as far as internal
situations and accumulation abilities of a national economy are concerned,
In the early fifties most of them were intensively developing
countries as a simple consequence of assumed economic development stra-
tegy aimed at accelerated growth and strenuous industrialization.
Later, however, the period of accelerated development either continued
or ceased to continue due to specific social, economic and political
interrelationships within them. As a result, each country was entering
a new phase of decelerating growth rate at its own time. The first was
the Soviet Union—in 1952—and then entered Poland, Romania and Hungary
—
two years later. In turn, unequal successive phases observed in the
early seventies have never occurred again. While four among the seven
countries included in Table 1, i.e., Bulgaria, Poland, Romania and
Hungary enjoyed considerable growth, the growth rates in Czechoslovakia,
East Germany and the Soviet Union were somewhat declining.
1 .1 Interrelations of the CMEA Countries
The question that arises at this point in connection with what has
been discussed so far concerns the reason for the cycle phase time
limits to coincide in respective countries under study. It should be
stressed that mutual influences can only be valid if a respective
national economy is actually part of an integrated system (Kolodko 1983).
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The problem of hypothetical growth cycle synchronization in the
socialist economy as viewed against the international background
comes down to a crucial question as to whether the existing ties
between subsystems—which economies of the CMEA countries really are--
have been strong enough to shape periodic alterations in economic
development dynamics.
The history of this economic organization, i.e., Council of Mutual
Economic Assistance, involves several stages, each posing still new
goals to reach. It seems unquestionable, however, that at least
throughout the two initial decades of the CMEA, major attention was
drawn to bilateral economic cooperation. A predominant form of this
cooperation was goods exchange but joint ventures in the domain of
investment , in the extracting industries as well as industrial co-
operation, proved inferior. Therefore, the beginning of a real
integration process dates back not earlier than the early seventies
when the Complex Programme of Intensification of Mutual Co-operation as
well as Development of Economic Integration of the CMEA Countries was
declared and subsequently accepted during the 25th CMEA Conference in
Bucharest in 1971.
But the integration is not strong enough to make it possible that
one country could exert substantial influence upon economic processes
including alterations in macroproportions and economic dynamics in
other CMEA countries. No doubt the Soviet Union's economy has a con-
siderable effect on the abilities of other socialist countries as they
mostly depend on the Soviet supplies of raw materials; these, broadly
speaking, are rather stable. On the other hand the recent economic
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crisis in Poland, as deep as it has been (see Figure 8), has to be
reflected in rates of economic growth in the CMEA group. They are
Poland's chief trade partners and so are particularly afflicted with a
considerable decrease in imports from Poland between 1980 and 1982.
1.2 Bilateral and Multilateral Relations
Hence the bilateral relationships remain a predominant form of eco-
nomic cooperation there and no indications exist that this is going to
change soon. Multilateral contacts have been but a complementary sec-
tor and this situation will apparently continue for a long time. There
is not much sense in arguing that mutual interactions do not exist at
all in the rates of growth of respective socialist economies. Yet they
are surely of minor significance and seem proportionate to the share of
mutual commodity turnover in national income of the countries under
study. Needless to say, those interactions are not so large as they
are in highly developed capitalist countries, especially those of the
EEC group.
Since the late seventies all European socialist countries have
faced a decrease in economic growth, at variable rates in respective
cases, when compared with a preceding period. Subsequent increase
rates vary as well. Broadly speaking, this is because of adverse
external and internal conditions which have overlapped in all those
countries since the mid-seventies. It would be a mistake to neglect
the impact of external economic disturbances on the economic perfor-
mance in centrally planned economies. On this subject see, for example,
Brown and Tardos (1980), Fallenbuchl (1980), Neuberger, Portes and
Tyson (1980), and Wolf (1976). However, the internal factors are of
more significance here.
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Internal factors primarily involve processes coming out of the
mechanism of cyclical economic growth while external ones result from
the generally unfavorable world market conditions and a complex politi-
cal situation (see, for example, Becker 1984). It is only in this
sense that one can say cyclical growth in the socialist economy is
internationalized. In other words, the socialist economy is a part of
the world economy and therefore it cannot avoid world-wide economic
tendencies.
A thesis could be put forward at this point that simultaneous
decreases in rates of economic growth in different socialist countries
has nothing to do with the synchronization of growth cycles for all
concerned economies. As we have seen earlier this synchronization is
not likely to happen due to the low integration level. Instead the
coincidence is being evoked by the world economic situation which has
increasingly become present in socialist economies through their access
to the international division of labor. To this must be added the
coincidence of decelerating growth phases of the cycles autonomous in
a respective country. This mechanism has also produced changes in eco-
nomic macroproportions which we could observe over two recent decades.
They are aimed
—
quite similarly as in Poland, though to a lesser extent
—
at the reduction of investment's share in national income in order to
maintain the level of consumption obtained or, as is the case of Hungary,
Romania and especially Poland, to minimize the rate of its drop so as
to prevent the decrease in the absolute level of satisfaction of the
society's needs. Another question which arises is: how does the
mechanism of cyclical economic growth actually work and what is this
mechanism's effect on social and economic goals accomplishment?
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2. Mechanism of Cyclical Economic Growth
The only regularity of the fluctuations of the rate of economic
growth is not a sufficient criterion to ascertain cyclical character of
a phenomenon. The other, even more important, criterion is the endoge-
nous mechanism of periodic oscillation, in this case dealing with
periodic changes in rates of economic growth. To ascertain that a phe-
nomenon is cyclical, it is always mandatory to look into its origin.
Periodic rate of growth alterations are caused by a complex system
of social, economic and political interdependences of which perhaps the
most important are short-term and long-term contradictions between con-
sumption and investment, existence of an overall investment cycle with
characteristic time-lag in its effects, and indivisibility of investment
(Bauer 1981 and Kolodko 1986a). Nearly as important is how deeply the
economy of a given country has been involved in the international divi-
sion of labor, what overall planning and management system has been
selected, and what growth program assumed.
One of the objectives of economic activity in socialism is to maxi-
mize satisfaction of the needs of the society under existing economic
conditions. In practice it is often translated into the efforts to
maximize national income so that the rate of investment could be ele-
vated as much as possible. But at the same time considerable investment
was directed to sector I of national economy, i.e., production of the
means of production. This, in turn, laid foundation to a strong invest-
ment expansion (see Figures 2 and 3) leading to an overall investment
cycle with characteristic time-lag in its effects. Investment expan-
tion taking place so vigorously produced difficulties in balancing, in
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material terms, of undertaken tasks. This was, among other things, the
background for social and political tension reflecting gradual decelera-
tion of consumption growth or even absolute decrease in its level, as
happened in some cases. It was accompanied by serious troubles in market
equilibrium and inflation (Kornai 1980, Kolodko 1986b and 1986c, and
Kolodko and McMahon 1986).
Such a situation is usually cured by changing the proportions of
the final distribution of national income for the benefit of the con-
sumption sphere (Mieczkowski 1978 and Bunce 1980). It can be achieved
either by reduction in the rate of accumulation or by decelerating its
growth hitherto. Simultaneously, substantial changes have to be made
in investment proportions in favor of those branches which produce con-
sumer goods, agriculture and non-material services. These measures,
supported by real production effects following a time-lag period,
enhance the growth of national income and thus consumption level as
well. Such tendencies may occasionally be combined with changes in the
•
foreign trade structure which is advantageous from the point of view of
the level of current consumption. Hence investment expansion subdues
for a while and major efforts are now concentrated on the accomplish-
ment of investments taken up in a preceding phase— "closing" of an
overall investment cycle. At times, the decentralizing tendency which
evolves is helpful in developing a greater degree of firms' self-
dependence. As a result of this, as well as due to rising consumption,
economic efficiency elevates to a higher level. At this point, it may
be worth considering making use of reserves accumulated earlier, if
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available under specific conditions. Meanwhile the process of acce-
lerating growth goes on.
As time passes, retardations in some branches—especially those in
raw materials and power supplies as well as in infrastructure—start to
impose themselves increasingly which throws the whole economy off its
equilibrium. Again some modification of the economic growth program is
a must. The nature of such a modification decides how strong and
distinct the forthcoming phases will be. The more radical the changes
that take place, the more visible are the features symptomatic of a
period which is about to come. As a result, the rate of growth in out-
put of the means of production increases. This signals the beginning
for a new overall investment cycle as soon as national income becomes
overwhelmed with investments (Soos 1975-76). Increasing the share of
consumption in distributed national income proves a simple consequence
of investment expansion. A substantial drop in consumption dynamics or
sometimes in its absolute level (see Figures 4 and 5) evokes frictions
of a social and political nature. The national economy re-enters a
period with the development dynamics slowing down although it may vary
enormously in details when compared with phases of decelerating growth
rates in the past (see Figures 6 and 7). Nevertheless, the essence of
this phenomenon always remains nearly the same.
No doubt, the history of the socialist economy is extremely short
in comparison with that of the capitalist economy. It proves long
enough, however, to ascertain the cyclical character of its reproduc-
tion process. A model of the socialist economy as described above has
not widely been accepted because, it is claimed, it is incomplete. The
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main problem is the role played by objective and subjective factors in
the formation of the growth process. In each economy—this especially
applies to the socialist one—these factors tend to overlap. At the
same time the role of subjective factors has been predominant in
centrally planned economies. In the model under discussion, transition
from the first phase into the second one is primarily determined by
objective factors, at least from a definite point, even though the
growing oscillation has its subjective reasons as well. The process
then is inevitable. On the other hand, subjective factors are of
utmost significance while shifting from the second phase of a preceding
cycle into the first phase of the cycle which follows. This transition
is inevitable, too, but its range and depth can be centrally controlled.
These are the subjective factors which usually make transition too
deep, thus setting in motion the whole mechanism anew.
It is clear that investment or, to be more specific, pressure
towards its continual growth plays a vital part in the described cycli-
cal mechanism. Reviewing various approaches to the reasons for exces-
sive investment pressure, we have to stress that it results neither
from centralization nor decentralization of the management system.
Neither does it seem sufficient to explain it merely in terms of the
divergence between the government's preferences and social expectations.
Then where is the real source of such a phenomenon and what is its
relevance to the endogenous mechanism of growth rate oscillation?
2. 1 "Expansion drive"
Janos Kornai (1982, p. 53) claims that the demand for investment is
almost insatiable in the socialist economy. In the capitalist economy
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the rate of investment expansion depends on estimates as to the future
profitability. Thus it is largely, though still insufficiently, con-
strained by risk considerations. While in the socialist economy:
"The volume of investment does not depend on the financial state of
the firms' sector, its present and future profits accumulated or addi-
tional savings, the condition of the state budget, or any expected
constraints on sales. It would be a mistake to omit these factors from
a growth model of a capitalist economy
—
just as it would be a mistake
to include them in the present model (of centrally planned economy)."
This refers to Kornai's model of growth in the socialist economy
which strongly insists on shortage and its predominant role in the
reproduction process. Based upon what has been discussed up to now,
the reasons for the so-called expansion drive can easily be mentioned.
They seem to fall into four groups. These are:
first: pressure of unsatisfied needs;
second: interests of various social and occupational strata;
third: the so-called state's developmental mission expressed in
the desire to obtain as fast a growth as possible so as to with-
stand the standards of contemporary world economy, especially
those of the most developed countries;
fourth: natural tendency of firms' managers to increase produc-
tion volume for the reasons of prestige. These efforts do not
involve risk connected with responsibility for investment.
All these reasons recur though with a variable force over time.
The point is that in the socialist economy, while a proper system
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of investment demand control is lacking, investment sooner or later pro-
duces signals of growing disproportions. They could easily be divided
into three groups
:
1. consumption share in national income drops below a level
considered as "normal";
2. investment commitment grows associated with growing expendi-
ture freeze which produces difficulties in plan implementation;
3. shortages become increasingly nagging to provoke social tension.
Such signals make the government correct economic macroproportions.
As a result, the national economy returns to a more stabilized growth
path or at least approaches it. But the factors encouraging investment
expansion do not cease. The three groups of signals reappear to inform
the government of a possibility—not necessity this time—to accelerate
investment. What happens this time is:
1. consumption share in national income grows above a level con-
sidered as "normal";
2. investment commitment and frozen resources tend to decrease;
3. shortages become reduced to mitigate social tension.
Since the mechanism of goal selection is not very efficient— for it
is always easier to add new goals than to eliminate those set up
before— the government succumbs to investment pressure. The national
economy enters the first phase of another growth cycle. And this is
why periodic oscillations in growth rates are of an endogenous nature,
and—hence—of a cyclical nature as well.
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2.2 Phases of the Cycle
Let us tackle this problem from another point of view. The cycle
implies a sequence of properly ordered conditions or processes leading
4
to the point at which it started or at which the sequence repeats again.
There are numerous cyclical economic phenomena. The capitalist economic
cycle and investment cycle are just a few to be mentioned. Relatively
regular, they are of an endogenous character in the sense that a phase
of accelerating growth incorporates premises for the growth rate dece-
leration in the next phase and vice versa. In order to give a compre-
hensive answer to the question of whether or not the oscillations under
discussion are of such a character, it is worth making a brief account
of distinctive features for each respective phase. We wish, at the
same time, to point out those elements which make them different and
causal connections between growth processes within two phases.
Phase I
1. Lower rate of growth of
national income.
2. Relatively higher rate of
growth in investment outlays
than in national income;
considerable growth of the
rate of investment.
Decelerating rate of growth
in consumption sphere.
Phase II
1. Higher rate of growth of
national income.
2. Narrowing a gap between
rates of growth of invest-
ment outlays and that of
national income (or national
income growing fast) ; slower
growth (or drop) of rate of
investment.
3. Accelerating rate of growth
in consumption sphere.
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5.
High rate of investment in
the means of production
sector.
Low rate of investment
growth in consumer goods
and agriculture sectors.
6. High rate- of growth and
high absolute level of
investment outlays for
construction and assembly
work.
7. Low share of expenditure
for replacement and
modernization.
8. Decreasing expenditure in
the sphere of unproductive
investment
.
9. Growth of frozen investment
outlays.
10. Preference of investment
goods imports in foreign
trade; relatively high share
of consumer goods in exports.
4. Low rate of investment growth
in the means of production
sector.
5. Accelerating rate of invest-
ment growth in consumer goods
and agriculture sectors
—
proximity to expenditure
dynamics in the means of
production sector.
6. High rate of growth and high
absolute level of investment
outlays for machines and
equipment.
7. High share of expenditure
for replacement and moderni-
zation of fixed assets.
8. Increasing expenditure for
unproductive investment.
9. Decrease in frozen invest-
ment outlays.
10. Changes in foreign trade
structure in favor of
current consumption.
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11. Realization of growth program 11. Change of economic growth
established in first years program realized before.
of economic cycle.
The reasons for and the course of alterations in economic dynamics,
as well as characteristics of particular growth phases as provided above,
reveal that relatively regular growth rate oscillations in the socialist
economy are of an endogenous nature. As a cyclical phenomenon, they are
caused by improper economic macroproportions.
It is not difficult to point at the whole set of interdependencies
between categories and social and economic processes presented here.
They are partly causal relations but mostly they are feedbacks. The
rule is that a tendency appearing in the first phase would provoke an
opposite tendency in the second one and vice versa. It is particularly
clear in the case of tendencies 2, 4, 7 and 10 of the first phase and
the resultant tendency 1 of the second phase of the same cycle. Let us
now reverse the train of thought. The consequence of tendencies 2, 4,
7, 8, 9 and 10 in the second phase is the formation of tendency 1 in the
first phase of the following cycle.
All those interdependencies can easily be derived taking any of the
characteristic elements of both cycle phases as a starting point. This
is a definite proof of the endogenous character of alternating phases
in reproduction process. Of course, there have been numerous exogenous
factors involved. These are mostly of no regular influence on the eco-
nomic growth rate in the socialist economy, except perhaps the relatively
synchronized economic cycle in the capitalist world.
-15-
3. Hypothesis of the "Long Cycle"
The model of cyclical changes disregards the fact that in reality
not all symptoms typical of respective phases are revealed in all
socialist countries. Many differences between the real course of
growth cycles and its model have persisted since the early seventies.
This could be explained in terms of variable, both internal and exter-
nal, development conditions throughout that period. In particular
—
this, in a sense, explains an overall deceleration of the economic
growth rate in the socialist countries since the late seventies (see,
for instance, Adirim 1983, Nove 1981, and Wiles 1982). This is due to
a considerable level of indebtedness of those countries, except the
Soviet Union. In recent years, however, the possibilities of deriving
funds from external sources to support development became rather
limited. Still more important was the fact that the extensive factors
of economic growth were found to be exhausted.
The foreign credits taken by the socialist country so readily in
the seventies proved an efficient means to reduce contradictions result-
ing from the final distribution of national income into investment and
consumption. In this way, however, the contradictions were merely
transferred to the future which caused decrease in the rate of accumu-
lation and general slowing down of economic dynamics at the turn of the
seventies and eighties. It may be anticipated that acceleration will
be restored following several years of a slow-down in economic quanti-
ties. It will probably last another several years, being a transitory
phase as it was in the past. The growth stabilization on a relatively
high level could be ensured on the condition, however, that the inten-
sive growth factors were fully explained. This in turn depends on
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necessary changes being carried out in economic and financial mecha-
nisms so as to eliminate the methods which, in the past, created cir-
cumstances for periodic growth deceleration.
It can be further assumed that in the eighties changes in economic
dynamics of the socialist countries will nearly coincide in time. This
assumption is based on several premises. First
—
perhaps the most impor-
tant one—is the action of the cyclical economic growth mechanism. It
will additionally be reinforced by external factors including the
effect of the world market on growth rates in the socialist countries.
The role of this factor is increasingly important. As important will be
specific tendencies revealed in the development process of respective
socialist countries as well as within the whole economic system aiming
toward tight integration.
3. I Modification of the "Traditional" Cycle
The discrepancy between the present model and the real growth cycles
in the socialist countries tends to increase as we are getting closer
to the present. Here we deal with an extended reproduction process
which means that national economy, except specific cases of recession,
has advanced to a higher level of productive forces and production rela-
tions. It may happen that some causes of a specific course of economic
growth and the phenomena usually accompanying them do not occur very
clearly or they fail to occur at all. But at the same time there appear
new factors and interrelations of socioeconomic development never faced
before or considered inferior.
From this point of view, the history of the socialist countries might
be divided into two basic periods. The first period, embracing the fifties
and sixties, incorporated traditional cycles, in general terms conforming
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to those presented in this model approach. The second period, which
started in the seventies, though not exactly at the same time in all
countries, involved clear modifications of a traditional cycle. The
modifications, among other things, consist of prolonged duration,
increased number of cycle phases and more variable character thereof.
The most important feature here is that, unlike in a traditional cycle,
changes in growth rates of all basic macroeconomic quantities, i.e.,
national income, accumulation, investment and consumption, have exactly
the same direction. The more intensive the use of foreign credits as
an additional source to promote development, the more far-reaching are
the changes. This is why these changes have most vividly appeared in
Poland where the transformation of economic macroproportions reached
the greatest scale.
From this point of view we can discuss four growth cycles which
have taken place since 1950 in Poland— the case which is the most spec-
tacular as far as economic growth cycles in the centrally planned eco-
nomies is concerned (see Figure 1). They embrace 1950-57, 1958-68,
1969-70 periods. The last one, which is hard to define as a cycle, was
initiated only to be stopped in the middle of its first phase as a con-
sequence of radical changes in the growth program after the crisis of
December 1970. In a sense then, logical continuity of the development
process was thus interrupted with all its consequences for modification
scale of the fourth cycle which started in 1971.
This is the "long cycle" composed of four phases. The first one
falling from 1971-75 might be considered as an accelerating growth phase;
the second one between 1976 and 1978 meant a transition into decelerating
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rate of growth; Che Chird one (1979-82) brought economic break-down/
economic recession or crisis phase (see Figure 8); the fourth one ini-
tiated in 1983 shows the efforts to regain equilibrium in the national
economy.
3. 2 Specific Causes of the "Long Cycle"
The "long cycle" proves to be completely different from the pre-
ceding cycles. The primary difference is that, unlike a traditional
cycle, the first phase of the modified cycle brought a simultaneous
acceleration in the rates of growth of national income, investments and
consumption (see Tables 2 and 3). In turn the second phase of tradi-
tional cycles involved adaptation processes to make it possible that
the pattern of processes sequence was almost exactly the same as in a
former cycle. Qualitative changes which took place in the first phase
of the modified cycle, in particular the range and intensity of these
changes, made the cycle markedly lengthen so as to develop new phases.
In the second phase of the "long cycle," adaptation processes appeared
insufficient to push national economy into the required development path.
Let us revert for a while to the signals warning that economic pro-
portions are increasingly getting out of balance. The disproportions
were slightly reduced due to foreign credits used to finance both invest-
ment and consumption spheres. It is thanks to those credits that shor-
tage not only did not increase but was reduced at an early phase of the
"long cycle" despite a considerable drop in the rate of consumption by as
much as 10 percentage points to reach a level which could hardly be con-
sidered "normal." For the same reason, there were no problems at first
to put into effect the investment program. Foreign debt growing fast,
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which alone should have been a warning signal for the government, merely
helped the government play down threats to the reproduction process and
to the abilities to satisfy social needs in the future, produced by the
6
wrong economic macroproportions.
The intensity of these signals increased as time passed on. So the
decision was made to change the growth program at the beginning of
the second phase of the cycle in 1976 which officially was then called
an economic maneuver. But it was not intensive enough, a bit belated
and, in practice, carried out inconsistently. Moreover, foreign credits
available at any time made it possible to continue the policy exercised
in the early seventies. Under such circumstances, warning signals had to
fail to reach the addressee. As a result, in the late seventies it was
too late to succeed in attempts to turn national economy back onto a
path of "normal" growth or at least to get close to it. What happened
then was a crisis phase offering warning signals now received by every-
body. Their intensity was multiplied many times—a simple consequence
of their negligence during previous phases.
Many years are necessary to overcome recession and this is why the
growth cycle has markedly extended. In order to eliminate recession
phenomena, it is indispensable not only to rearrange the structure of
social goals and to reduce their range for some time but also to modify
economic macroproportions under new circumstances (Tyson 1981). Such a
necessity—transition into an intensive development phase on the one
hand and a strain on national economy due to foreign indebtedment on
the other—may cause a significant and prolonged drop in the rate of
economic growth below the level typical of a long period.
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4. Effects of Cyclical Growth and the Ways of Counteracting It
The very fact of the growth rates oscillations around a constant
positive trend does not forejudge an unfavorable character of such a
reproduction process. Both advantages and disadvantages should be
carefully considered.
Numerous unquestionably negative consequences evolve from the ana-
lysis of the periodic oscillations mechanism. It is clear at first
glance if we look at general characteristics of cycle phases. The
growth rate decrease in the consumption sphere (see Table 3) or, at
times, its absolute drop— the first phase of the traditional cycle and
the second and third phases of the modified cycle—cause obvious
socioeconomic losses apart from critical phenomena of a political
nature. These consequences prove key factors producing inability to
satisfy the social needs to an expected degree. To this must be added
that an aggregate consumption growth at decelerating rate, in par-
ticular when associated with inflation, often brings an absolute
decrease in the consumption level for some population groups as it is
tightly connected with the real income formation. Their increase is
slowest in the periods starting growth cycles, the rule being observed
in all traditional cycles so far. In the case of the modified cycle
these problems tend to shift into the latter phases.
In discussing the issue of satisfaction of social needs, special
attention should be drawn to the insufficient investment outlays in the
non-productive sector. It is exceptionally visible during initial cycle
phases to contribute to worsening, either relative or absolute, of ser-
vices rendered by this sector in terms both of their quantity and quality.
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4. 1 Negative Consequences of Cyclical Growth
Numerous losses of an economic nature are reflected in the follow-
ing way:
- bottlenecks occur blocking the national economy from utilizing all
its potentials and from obtaining production volume attainable;
- technological progress is not steady, there are obstacles to introducing
innovations
;
- permanent inability is manifestly visible to maintain necessary reserves
at required level;
- structural disproportions appear hard to reduce in a short time—chiefly
in raw materials and power supplies;
- problems become increasingly severe to coordinate economic growth,
to ensure qualified personnel and thus to balance the labor market;
- costs of reconversions of production grow involving changes in growth
programs established before;
- modernization investment sphere becomes neglected and decapitalizat ion
of fixed assets increases;
- balance of payments is hard to obtain;
- investment are either constrained or delayed which produces time-lags
and involves additional costs.
The last factor may additionally lead to partial outflow of social
production from reproduction process. This results from an increasing
number of unfinished investments (frozen outlays), a rise in reserves
and a relative increase in the use of materials which is far ahead of
growth rates in the aggregate product.
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The above mentioned cyclical growth consequences do not exhaust the
issue. We have only mentioned those which prove substantial. They
have a vital bearing on social and political spheres. They manifest
themselves in a lessening of social activity and initiative as well as
on the discipline of labor. People feel discouraged about taking up
more ambitious tasks to improve their firms' effectiveness and to take
care of public property. Unless the government skillfully counteracts
these phenomena, occurring with a growing intensity, they usually lead
to severe social and political conflicts. Polish experiences are of the
utmost significance here.
Socioeconomic consequences of a cyclical character of the reproduc-
tion process should be viewed with a peculiar profit and loss balance
taken into account. The endogenous nature of the tendencies and rela-
tions under discussion makes us think that negative tendencies
appearing in one cycle phase must inevitably evoke positive ones in the
following phase and, unfortunately, vice versa. At the same time, the
situation is more complex in the case of the modified cycle for it
involves a multi-phase development. This is how negative consequences
of some tendencies were "compensated" by positive effects when opposite
tendencies approached. The problem then might be defined by means of
the following questions:
What is the span between a period of relative—or absolute— losses
and a period of future profits?
To what extent do the anticipated profits surpass suffered losses/
additional costs?
-23-
It is much easier to answer the former question—the span results
directly from decelerating growth phases within successive cycles.
With reference to the formation of some quantities, the consequences
under discussion might be considered as justifiable. At times there
were objective limitations of a purely technical and, more often, an
economic nature dealing with a relatively low level of development of
productive forces as, for instance, time-lag at the moment of taking up
the investment expansion for the first time.
It should be emphasized that the cyclical character of economic
growth in the socialist economy produces severe losses in economic,
political and social planes alike. It should be stressed at the same
time that some of them prove extremely difficult to make up no matter
how much time we have
.
In turn, the anticipated profits usually fail to meet expectations
and thus they do not fully compensate costs and losses suffered before.
Moreover, the "compensation periods" tend to shorten. They were never
longer than periods of losses and the compensation not always embraced
all social strata. There is one who suffers losses and somebody else
who profits by them later on. In this way a kind of an inter-generation
redistribution of wealth and national income was taking place.
4 .2 Ways of Counteracting the Cycles
From this point of view cyclical growth in socialism must be judged
as an unfavorable phenomenon. Therefore, we should attempt to point
out ways and means to reduce such a character of reproduction process.
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To materialize this, it is crucial to select in advance a proper
development policy so that the primary source of the cyclical nature
of growth can be neutralized. On the other hand, efficient means are
required to minimize cyclical growth consequences having been an
accomplished fact.
The latter approach has as yet been prevailing. This, broadly
speaking, resulted from negligence of the fact that socioeconomic
mechanism of cyclical growth continued to function. This is why imme-
diate interventions merely influenced the consequences and not the
causes of this process thus being unable to produce required long-term
effects. The present economic situation and observable future tenden-
cies make it clear that both methods should be employed simultaneously,
though the former one, i.e., proper development policy exercised in
advance, offers some promise for much better results.
As was made clear earlier, an overall investment cycle, apart from
wrong economic macroproportions
,
proves the basic reason for the growth
cyclical character. Here, again, we should try to seek means to reduce
cyclical process. This incorporates actions aimed at time-lag shorten-
ing, decreasing investment indivisibility and preventing excessive
investment expansion in the short run. It is quite obvious that full
reduction of the time-lag is not feasible for the reason of technical
limitations as, for instance, investment indivisibility. However, there
are prospects to decrease the scale of this phenomenon. To accomplish
this, it is necessary to establish "investment portions" for respective
periods and to shorten realization cycles assumed for material tasks.
The lower limit of the "investment portion" is indicated by the degree
-25-
of indivisibility of a given investment. But certain opportunities for
decreasing frozen outlays are offered if investment enterprises are in
parts being successively engaged in production where it is technically
available. The postulate of shortening investment cycles, although
pertinent, requires some reservation. The problem centers not only on
obtaining as high efficiency of production and services as possible but
also being aware of how to avoid excessive investment in the short run.
Simultaneous shortening of real cycles within a wide range of invest-
ments might as well produce excessive task cumulation. In that case it
would not last long but instead would repeat more often. Therefore,
overall investment cycles would continue to occur with an increased
frequency.
More effective, then, is to avoid excessive investment which pre-
vents forced growth in rates of accumulation and investment. Investment
must be so spread in time that at a given volume and steady growth rate
its effects could appear at a steady rate as well. It is feasible on
the condition that efficient methods of investment planning are developed.
The mathematical and econometric optimization methods are of vital im-
portance here. Considerable advantages in the area should be taken under
the present economic recession while investment growth has been radically
inhibited. On the other hand, we are extremely menaced with another
investment expansion concentrated in the short run in the forthcoming
years. There will be a strong tendency to expand investment to satisfy
unquestioned needs in this area.
Certain opportunity to decrease the scale of cyclical growth is of-
fered by proper use of credits in foreign trade. These must always be
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limited, however, if misused they may prove harmful. Here, again,
Polish experiences are perhaps of utmost significance.
Periodic increase in the demand of investment goods in a national
economy cannot always be satisfied promptly by means of the domestic
resources. It is mandatory to use the external sources of accumulation
(foreign debt) unless there are obstacles resulting from the current
world economic conditions. But it is possible to proceed the other way
around : obtaining consumption credits may be associated with a change
in the final structure of the domestic product so as to increase the
share of capital goods. In either case similar immediate effects may
be anticipated in the consumption sphere and in the proportions of the
final distribution of national income into consumption and investment.
It is much more profitable to select the former way because—if it is
used rationally and with moderation well-founded from economic point of
view— it usually provides access to the newest technology, thus broadly
contributing to the future production volume and quality. It should be
borne in mind, however, that some objective difficulties may arise
since the domestic industry is not flexible enough to be changed into a
new production departing from its usual product both in the sector of
the means of production and in the consumption goods sector.
Yet, in order to eliminate the causes of the cyclical character of
economic growth, or at least to diminish its influence, it is always
essential to establish proper economic macroproportions. The socio-
economic mechanism of cyclical growth as described above implies it
very clearly. The contradictions between consumption and investment
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have to be skillfully overcome and the long-term planning methods as
well as the management system in the national economy must be improved.
5. Conclusions
The analysis of the long-term growth trend in socialist countries
allows us to ascertain the regular character of periodic changes in
economic dynamics. It manifests itself in the form of alternating
periods of higher and lower dynamics in the basic macroeconomic quan-
tities, the most intensive oscillations occurring in the investment
sector.
Having observed this, we are eager to ask questions about the
causes and the mechanisms of this process. The detailed analysis leads
us to the conclusion that these mechanisms are of an endogenous nature
which implies an accelerating growth phase incorporating objective pre-
mises of growth deceleration in the following phase and vice versa.
This is why reproduction process is of a cyclical nature.
The hypothesis of relative synchronization of growth cycles within
the international socialist system has been strongly criticized. Such
a synchronization was partly observed between 1950 and 1970. Ever
since then the cycle phases have not coincided. This results from a
different formation of autonomous cycles from one country to another on
the one hand and a low integration level between socialist economies on
the other.
On the turn of the seventies and eighties the whole CMEA system as
well as its respective members were facing growth deceleration as a
response to exhaustion of the extensive factors of growth and increasing
difficulty in maintaining the external equilibrium.
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The "long cycle" hypothesis has been put forward to define several
recent years, particularly distinct in the Polish economy. It is
modified as compared with earlier "traditional" cycles. Its modified
character originates from an extended share of the foreign credits used
to finance development in the first phase of the cycle. As a result,
the cycle prolongs and new phases are developed with more complex
characteristics then before.
The cyclical nature of economic growth in socialism is very closely
connected with the issue of its influence on the state's abilities to
satisfy needs of the society. This influence has been estimated as
negative on the basis of losses and profits balance. This is why some
theses have been put forward as to the selection of means that could
reduce the causes of the cyclical character of growth and mitigate its
negative consequences.
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Table 1 : Economic Growth Cycles in Socialist Countries
(Average Annual Rates of Growth of National Income)
Periods
untry
Rates of Growth ( in %)
*
lgaria N.A. 1953-56 1957-59 1960-63 1964-67 1968-71 1972-75 1976-80 1981-84
6.5 14.0 6.0 9.1 7.4 8.3 6.4 3.9
- + - + - + - -
echoslovakia 1950-52 1953-56 1957-61 1962-65 1966-69 1970-75 1976-78 1979-84
10.0 6.5 7.4 0.8 7.2 5.3 4.7 1.8
- + - + - - -
St Germany 1950-52 1953-56 1957-59 1960-63 1964-69 1970-75 1976-84
18.0 6.7 8.7 2.2 5.0 5.7 4.3
- + - + + -
ngary 1951-53 1954-56 1957-60 1961-65 1966-69 1970-74 1975-78 1979-84
9.3 2.0 11.0 5.4 7.2 6.2 5.0 1.3 1
- + - + - - -
^
land 1950-53 1954-57 1958-63 1964-68 1969-70 1971-75 1976-78 1979-82 1983-85
9.8 9.1 5.4 7.1 3.7 9.8 4.9 -6.5 4.9
- - + - + - - +
mania 1951-53 1954-56 1957-59 1960-62 1963-66 1967-70 1971-76 1977-79 1980-84
17.0 5.0 10.6 7.6 10.5 7.0 11.5 7.7 4.0
- + - + - + - -
viet Union 1950-51 1952-53 1954-56 1957-63 1964-68 1969-73 1974-78 1979-84
16.0 8.2 11.6 6.0 8.2 6.5 5.0 3.2 £
- + - + - - - i
rce: tocznik Statystyczny ( Statistical Yearbook ), GUS , Warszawa, various issues.
.
- data not available
- acceleration
- slowdown
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Table^: Economic Growth In Poland (1950-1985)
(1950=100)
Year National Income Investment Consumption
1950 100.0 100.0 100.0
51 107.5 111.1 108.0
52 114.1 133.4 111.2
53 125.8 160.9 114.7
54 139.1 171.5 135.0
1955 151.5 177.0 148.6
56 163.3 182.2 163.9
57 185.6 201.7 182.3
58 191.5 221.0 188.1
59 204.9 261.7 200.0
1960 211.1 273.5 203.4
61 226.5 296.4 215.8
62 232.6 345.6 223.6
63 247.2 351.2 233.8
64 259.3 367.7 244.6
1965 280.9 411.8 259.8
66 301.6 462.8 275.9
67 315.2 520.2 290.8
68 342.0 583.7 309.9
69 354.0 624.0 325.8
1970 371.7 638.3 339.1
71 408.1 703.4 365.2
72 459.1 891.3 398.5
73 524.8 1138.1 430.7
74 587.7 1392.0 462.6
1975 643.6 1560.4 514.0
76 685.4 1546.3 559.2
77 700.5 1588.1 597.2
78 704.0 1524.6 607.4
79 677.9 1289.8 626.2
1980 637.3 962.2 639.3
81 570.4 729.3 609.9
82 510.5 584.2 539.8
83 539.1 639.7 571.1
84 566.0 718.4 596.2
1985 584.1 764.4 602.2
Source: Rocznik Statystyczny ( Statistical Yearbook ), GUS , Warszawa,
various issues.
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Table 3 : Economic Growth in Poland (1950-1985)
Annual Rates
(in %)
Year National Income Investment Consumption
1950 15.2 34.8 8.6
51 7.5 11.1 8.0
52 6.1 20.1 3.0
53 10.3 20.6 3.1
54 10.6 6.6 17.7
1955 8.9 3.2 10.1
56 7.8 2.9 10.3
57 13.6 10.7 11.2
58 3.2 9.6 3.2
59 7.0 18.4 6.3
1960 3.0 4.5 1.7
61 7.3 8.4 6.1
62 2.7 16.6 3.6
63 6.3 1.6 4.6
64 4.9 4.7 4.6
1965 8.3 12.0 6.2
66 7.4 12.4 6.2
67 4.5 12.4 5.4
68 8.5 12.2 6.6
69 3.5 6.9 5.1
1970 5.0 2.3 4.1
71 9.8 10.2 7.7
72 12.5 26.7 9.1
73 14.3 27.7 8.1
74 12.0 22.3 7.4
1975 9.5 12.1 11.1
76 6.5 -0.9 8.8
77 2.2 2.7 6.8
78 0.5 -4.0 1.7
79 -3.7 -15.4 3.1
1980 -6.0 -25.4 2.1
81 -10.5 -24.2 -4.6
82 -10.5 -19.9 -11.5
83 5.6 9.5 5.8
84 5.0 12.3 4.4
1985 3.2 6.4 1.0
Maximum 15.20 34.80 17.70
Minimum -10.50 -25.40 -11.50
Average 5.61 7.56 5.46
Variance 34.88 171.01 22.22
Standard
Deviation 5.91 13.08 4.71
Source: Rocznik Statystyczny ( Statistical Yearbook ), GUS, Warszawa,
various issues, and author's own calculations.
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Footnotes
We disregard here the analysis of growth processes in the late
1940s due to remarkably distinct character of that period.
2
"From methodological point of view this approach involves, apart
from statistical examination, also econometric analysis. Here the so-
called "crawling trend" method has been used. For further data see
Gruszczynski and Kolodko (1975). Similar periodization has been deve-
loped by many authors using different methods. A systematic list of
results jointly with criteria assumed in analyses are mentioned in the
above article.
3
It could be observed in other socialist countries including
Yugoslavia and China. See Mine 1979.
4
In the case of economic growth cycle under discussion an initial
status is achieved but in qualitative not in quantitative terms as well
as general sequence of the process occurs repeatedly.
It is worth mentioning here that the business cycles in capitalism
prove decreasingly regular throughout many years. This particularly
applies to recent years' business cycles.
Such signals are often essential to correct economic macropropor-
tions at a proper time. This policy has been exercised in Hungary,
Czechoslovakia and East Germany.
This is worth saying how great the Polish crisis of the early
1980s has been:
If Poland were a capitalistic country in a similar
crisis, painful but fairly automatic processes and
policy response would be set in motion. There would
be hyperinflation, currency devaluation, drastic
public expenditure cuts and deflationary taxation
measures, tight money, high interest rates, dis-
investment, bankruptcies and plant closures, and a
couple of million unemployed. Some external credi-
tors would get very little, or nothing at all,
following the financial collapse of their debtors;
some of the remaining debt would be offset by the
sale to foreigners of financial assets (shares,
bonds), land, building and plant. Fresh external
finance would be available to the more credible
borrowers. Unemployment would keep the unions in
check, restraining real wages and ensuring labor
discipline. The drop in real wage trends and indus-
trial streamlining would eventually promote exports
and encourage new investment, attracting foreign
capital; in ten years or so the economy would be
getting out of the crisis (Nuti 1982, p. 47).
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